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International Relations June 12, 2026 6 min read Daily brief · #4 of 19

Asked India to buy Russian oil, then hit us with tariffs: Jaishankar on US flip-flops

India's Ministry of External Affairs, in remarks delivered at an international forum in Finland, publicly highlighted a contradiction in US trade and energy ...


What Happened

  • India's Ministry of External Affairs, in remarks delivered at an international forum in Finland, publicly highlighted a contradiction in US trade and energy policy: the US had specifically encouraged India to purchase Russian crude oil after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to help stabilise global oil markets, yet subsequently imposed punitive tariffs on Indian exports partly on account of those same Russian oil imports.
  • After the Russia-Ukraine war began, Russia's share of Indian crude imports rose sharply — from approximately 2% pre-war to over 35% by 2024–25 — partly because European buyers pivoted to Middle Eastern oil, displacing India's traditional Gulf suppliers and pushing India towards discounted Russian barrels.
  • The Trump administration imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports, including a 25% levy explicitly linked to India's Russian oil imports. These were subsequently reduced to 18% under an interim bilateral trade framework and later to 10% following a US Supreme Court ruling striking down the broader global tariff regime.
  • India's position frames its energy purchasing decisions as driven by market necessity and explicit encouragement from the US, making the subsequent tariff imposition an inconsistent application of trade pressure.
  • The episode illustrates the broader friction between India's energy security imperatives and US secondary sanctions policy targeting Russian oil revenues in the context of the Ukraine conflict.

Static Topic Bridges

India's Energy Security Policy and Import Diversification

India is one of the world's largest energy importers, with crude oil import dependency at approximately 81.4% of total consumption. The government's energy security strategy prioritises import diversification — increasing source countries and reducing reliance on any single region. India has expanded its crude oil suppliers from 27 to 41 countries over the past decade. Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs) provide approximately 7–8 weeks of emergency coverage; India's SPR capacity exceeds 5.3 million metric tonnes, with an expansion target of 6.5 million metric tonnes.

  • India's SPR is managed through underground rock caverns at Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh), Mangaluru (Karnataka), and Padur (Karnataka).
  • Before the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian crude was only ~2% of India's import mix; by 2024–25, it accounted for approximately one-third (33%) of total imports.
  • Between 2025 and early 2026, Russia's share dipped below 25% for the first time in two years, partly due to US sanctions pressure, payment challenges, and shipping constraints.
  • Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE together constitute the next largest share (~40% in 2025) of India's oil imports.
  • The Strait of Hormuz accounts for approximately 40% of India's crude import routes.

Connection to this news: India's large-scale purchase of Russian crude was a response to market conditions and geopolitical encouragement, not a policy deviation — making the US tariff framing of those purchases a point of contention in the bilateral trade relationship.

US Secondary Sanctions and the Russia-Ukraine Energy Dimension

Following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US and its Western allies imposed broad sanctions on Russian energy exports, aiming to reduce revenues funding the war. The G7 introduced a "price cap" mechanism (December 2022) on Russian crude and petroleum products: buyers could purchase Russian oil below a specified ceiling ($60/barrel for crude) and still access Western shipping, insurance, and financial services. Countries purchasing Russian oil above the cap — or facilitating such purchases — risked US secondary sanctions.

  • G7 Price Cap on Russian crude oil: $60 per barrel (in force since December 5, 2022).
  • India was never formally accused of violating the price cap regime, but its large Russian oil imports attracted US political pressure.
  • The Trump administration (from January 2025) adopted a more transactional approach to tariffs, using them as leverage across multiple bilateral issues simultaneously.
  • US tariffs on India: initially up to 50%, reduced to 18% under an interim framework, then 10% following a Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the broader tariff regime.
  • India has maintained that its oil procurement decisions are sovereign commercial decisions driven by price, availability, and energy security.

Connection to this news: The explicit US request that India buy Russian oil — to help stabilise global markets after European buyers shifted away — and the subsequent punitive tariff directly linked to those same purchases represents the contradiction at the centre of India's diplomatic objection.

India-US Trade and the Tariff Dispute Framework

India and the US are among each other's top trading partners. Bilateral trade in goods stood at approximately $130 billion in 2024–25. The Trump administration's use of tariffs as a multi-purpose diplomatic and economic instrument — applied simultaneously to trade balances, energy policy, and geopolitical alignment — has introduced significant friction into the relationship. An "interim trade framework" agreed between the two countries reduced but did not eliminate tariffs, pending a more comprehensive trade agreement.

  • India-US bilateral goods trade (2024–25): approximately $130 billion.
  • US tariff trajectory on India: up to 50% (initial) → 18% (interim framework) → 10% (post-Supreme Court ruling).
  • India runs a goods trade surplus with the US, which has been a recurring US complaint.
  • Tariff disputes between India and the US have been a recurring feature since 2018–19 (GSP withdrawal, retaliatory tariffs).
  • An "interim trade deal" is distinct from a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) — it covers specific tariff lines without full market access commitments.

Connection to this news: The tariff on Indian exports tied to Russian oil purchases represents an unusual entanglement of energy policy with trade policy, converting what India frames as a legitimate energy diversification decision into a bilateral trade grievance.

Russia-Ukraine War and Global Energy Market Disruption

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered the most significant disruption to global energy markets since the 1973 oil shock. European nations, which had been heavily dependent on Russian gas and oil, undertook rapid supply diversification — pivoting to US LNG, Norwegian gas, and Middle Eastern oil. This European pivot significantly reduced supply availability to traditional buyers like India from the Gulf, while Russian barrels became available at steep discounts to compensate for Western boycotts.

  • Russia accounts for approximately 12% of global crude oil production and was Europe's largest supplier pre-war.
  • India saved an estimated $35–40 billion in the 2022–24 period by purchasing discounted Russian crude, according to various analyses.
  • India's position: purchase decisions are driven by affordability and energy security, and are consistent with its longstanding "strategic autonomy" doctrine in foreign policy.
  • The Non-Alignment legacy underpins India's refusal to join Western sanctions coalitions, positioning India as a "strategic balancer" rather than a sanctions enforcer.

Connection to this news: The displacement of India's traditional Middle Eastern suppliers by European demand, combined with the US's initial encouragement of Russian crude purchases to keep markets stable, forms the factual basis for India's critique of the subsequent tariff imposition.

Key Facts & Data

  • India's crude oil import dependency: ~81.4% of total consumption
  • Russia's share in India's crude imports (pre-war, 2021): ~2%
  • Russia's share in India's crude imports (peak, 2024–25): ~33–35%
  • Russia's share in India's crude imports (early 2026): below 25% (declining due to sanctions pressure)
  • India's SPR capacity: 5.3 million metric tonnes (expansion target: 6.5 million metric tonnes)
  • SPR coverage: approximately 7–8 weeks of emergency consumption
  • SPR locations: Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur
  • G7 Russian oil price cap (crude): $60 per barrel (effective December 5, 2022)
  • US tariff on Indian exports: up to 50% → 18% (interim framework) → 10% (post-Supreme Court ruling)
  • India-US bilateral goods trade (2024–25): ~$130 billion
  • India's total source countries for crude imports: expanded from 27 to 41
  • Iraq + Saudi Arabia + UAE share of India's crude (2025): ~40%
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. India's Energy Security Policy and Import Diversification
  4. US Secondary Sanctions and the Russia-Ukraine Energy Dimension
  5. India-US Trade and the Tariff Dispute Framework
  6. Russia-Ukraine War and Global Energy Market Disruption
  7. Key Facts & Data
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