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International Relations June 08, 2026 4 min read Daily brief · #25 of 25

India, China should stick to 'right strategic perception' of being cooperative partners, not rivals: Beijing

Chinese authorities have publicly urged India to maintain the framing of their bilateral relationship as that of "cooperative partners" rather than competito...


What Happened

  • Chinese authorities have publicly urged India to maintain the framing of their bilateral relationship as that of "cooperative partners" rather than competitors or rivals, describing this as the "right strategic perception."
  • The statement comes amid cautious diplomatic warming following the landmark LAC (Line of Actual Control) disengagement agreement of October 2024.
  • The Special Representatives framework — a high-level boundary negotiation channel that had been suspended for five years — was resumed in December 2024, with an Expert Group established in August 2025 to explore phased boundary delimitation.
  • India relaxed investment restrictions in March 2026 by amending Press Note 3 — a 2020 regulation requiring government approval for all investments from countries sharing a land border with India — signalling tentative economic re-engagement.
  • Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to visit India when New Delhi hosts the BRICS Summit in September 2026.

Static Topic Bridges

India-China Border Dispute and the LAC

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the de facto border between India and China in the absence of a formally demarcated and mutually agreed boundary. It stretches approximately 3,488 km across three sectors: Western (Ladakh), Middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), and Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim).

  • The LAC is not a recognised international border; both sides hold differing perceptions of where it lies.
  • The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unconfirmed number of Chinese troops, triggering a major diplomatic crisis.
  • The last two remaining friction points — Depsang Plains and Demchok — were addressed in an agreement signed on October 21, 2024.
  • Patrolling rights in Depsang and Demchok were restored to pre-2020 levels following the October 2024 deal.
  • In December 2024, both sides announced disengagement had been "achieved in full."

Connection to this news: China's appeal for a "cooperative partners" perception is directed at a relationship still recovering from the 2020 crisis. The LAC disengagement provides the material basis for the rhetorical shift China is promoting — but strategic trust remains low.

Special Representatives Framework

The Special Representatives (SR) framework is a high-level bilateral mechanism created in 2003, under which the designated Special Representatives from each country meet periodically to negotiate a framework for a final settlement of the boundary question.

  • India's Special Representative is the National Security Advisor; China's is a senior State Councillor.
  • The framework had not met for five years before its revival in December 2024.
  • The SR meetings operate at a higher political level than the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), which handles military and diplomatic interactions along the LAC.
  • Under the SR framework, an Expert Group was established in August 2025 to work on an "early harvest" solution for phased boundary clarification.

Connection to this news: China's emphasis on a cooperative strategic perception is both a diplomatic signal and a prerequisite narrative for advancing SR-level boundary negotiations — which require political confidence to progress.

Press Note 3 and India's Investment Policy Toward China

Press Note 3 of 2020 amended the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy to require government approval — rather than the automatic route — for all investments from countries sharing a land border with India. This was widely understood as a targeted measure against Chinese FDI following the Galwan clashes.

  • Countries affected by Press Note 3: China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Afghanistan.
  • The 2020 amendment reversed India's earlier open approach, under which Chinese investment had grown substantially in the Indian start-up ecosystem.
  • India's March 2026 amendment to relax Press Note 3 selectively reopened certain investment pathways for Chinese entities.
  • The relaxation is widely interpreted as a confidence-building measure linked to the improved border situation.

Connection to this news: The Press Note 3 relaxation is a concrete economic signal matching China's rhetorical push for a cooperative framing — indicating India is cautiously reciprocating, even while strategic wariness persists.

Key Facts & Data

  • LAC length: approximately 3,488 km across three sectors.
  • Galwan Valley clashes: June 2020 — 20 Indian soldiers killed.
  • LAC disengagement agreement (Depsang and Demchok): October 21, 2024.
  • Full disengagement announced: December 2024.
  • Special Representatives framework revived: December 2024 (after five-year gap).
  • Expert Group for boundary delimitation established: August 2025.
  • India relaxed Press Note 3 investment restrictions: March 2026.
  • Expected Xi Jinping visit to India: September 2026 (BRICS Summit).
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. India-China Border Dispute and the LAC
  4. Special Representatives Framework
  5. Press Note 3 and India's Investment Policy Toward China
  6. Key Facts & Data
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