Expert Explains | Why Quad has never picked up momentum, and takeaways from New Delhi meet

The Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in New Delhi on May 26, 2026, bringing together the foreign ministers of India, the United States, Japan, and Au...

What Happened

The Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in New Delhi on May 26, 2026, bringing together the foreign ministers of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia.
The meeting produced several concrete deliverables: the inaugural Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) initiative for information sharing and maritime domain awareness; a Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework; a Fiji port infrastructure project (the Quad's first joint infrastructure initiative); and a Quad Initiative on Indo-Pacific Energy Security.
Despite these outcomes, analysts noted that the Quad has consistently announced more initiatives than it has delivered on — and that 2025 was the grouping's most difficult year, with a leaders' summit postponed, India-US tariff friction, and American handling of the India-Pakistan Pahalgam crisis leaving New Delhi visibly dissatisfied.
The Quad's structural limitations — it is an informal dialogue forum without a secretariat, treaty obligations, or an integrated command — mean that translating announcements into operationalised outcomes remains a recurring challenge.
The New Delhi meeting was nonetheless seen as stabilising the grouping after a turbulent 2025, with the maritime surveillance and critical minerals initiatives offering new areas of cooperation.

Static Topic Bridges

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) — Full History

The Quad is an informal strategic dialogue grouping comprising four democracies: India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Its origins lie in the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the four countries coordinated naval disaster relief. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formalised it in 2007 as the "Quad," with the first official meeting held at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. The grouping dissolved in 2008 when Australia withdrew under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who sought to avoid antagonising China. It was revived in 2017 at the ASEAN Summits in Manila, driven by China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the Quad was elevated to leaders' level, holding its first in-person summit in Washington D.C. (September 2021).

First formation: 2007, at ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila. Initiated by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe.
Dissolution: 2008 — Australia withdrew under PM Kevin Rudd to avoid Chinese diplomatic pressure.
Revival: 2017, ASEAN Summits, Manila — all four leaders agreed to revive.
Elevation to leaders' level: 2021 — first virtual summit (March 2021) and first in-person summit (September 2021, Washington D.C.).
Members: India, United States, Japan, Australia — all large democracies with significant maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Character: Informal dialogue forum — no formal treaty, no charter, no secretariat, no mutual defence clause.
Key initiatives (cumulative): Vaccine partnership (COVAX supplement), climate and clean energy, infrastructure (Blue Dot Network analogue), maritime surveillance, critical minerals, cyber security, space cooperation.

Connection to this news: The New Delhi meeting's outcomes — maritime surveillance, critical minerals, Fiji port — reflect the Quad's continuing effort to move from a "security dialogue" to a "delivery platform." The persistence of the momentum question directly tests UPSC knowledge of what the Quad is (and is not) institutionally.

India's Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Reservations

India's approach to the Indo-Pacific concept differs from the United States' and Japan's formulations. The US and Japan promoted the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) concept — first articulated by PM Abe in August 2016 — which has an explicit dimension of countering China's maritime assertiveness. India accepts the geographic and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific but resists the framing as an anti-China containment strategy. India prefers an "inclusive" Indo-Pacific that does not force countries to choose sides, consistent with its broader foreign policy of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. India is simultaneously a member of the Quad, BRICS, SCO, and ASEAN-led forums, reflecting this balancing act.

India's official position: supports a "free, open, and inclusive" Indo-Pacific — the word "inclusive" is India's addition to the FOIP language, implying China need not be excluded.
India's strategic autonomy: India avoids what PM Modi has called "alliances of containment" — it will not join a formal military alliance against any country.
India's memberships: Quad (strategic); SCO (where China and Pakistan are members); BRICS (China and Russia are members); ASEAN-led forums (EAS, ARF) — India uses all simultaneously.
"Act East Policy": India's engagement with East and Southeast Asia, launched as "Look East" in 1992 and renamed "Act East" in 2014, is the strategic framework within which Indo-Pacific partnerships operate.
India supports "ASEAN centrality" — the principle that ASEAN should be at the centre of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture, not supplanted by groupings like the Quad.
India's maritime doctrine: the Indian Navy's Maritime Security Strategy identifies the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as the primary area of operational focus; the Quad's maritime surveillance initiative aligns with this.

Connection to this news: The analysts' observation that the Quad "lacks momentum" partly reflects India's own calibrated approach — India will not allow the Quad to become a military alliance or a direct anti-China front, which limits the grouping's operational depth. This is a recurring UPSC Mains theme on India's balancing diplomacy.

India-US Defence Foundational Agreements — The Architecture Underpinning Quad

India-US defence cooperation is operationalised through three "foundational agreements" that provide the interoperability framework for military cooperation. These agreements are relevant to the Quad's maritime and intelligence-sharing dimensions.

LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement): Signed 2016. Allows India and the US to use each other's designated military facilities for replenishment of supplies (fuel, food, spare parts, maintenance services). India's first such agreement with any country.
COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement): Signed 2018. Enables the US to provide India with encrypted communications equipment and systems, allowing secure communications between Indian and US military commanders, ships, and aircraft. Key for interoperability in joint operations.
BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement): Signed 2020. Allows sharing of geospatial intelligence, satellite data, nautical and aeronautical charts, and real-time intelligence between the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and India's Ministry of Defence. Significantly enhances India's precision-strike capabilities.
These three agreements (sometimes called the "foundational agreements troika") together form the bedrock of India-US military interoperability.
A fourth agreement, the Industrial Security Annex (ISA), was signed in 2019, enabling sharing of classified defence technology between Indian and US industry.

Connection to this news: The Quad's first Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) — announced at the New Delhi meeting — is operationally enabled by COMCASA (secure communications) and BECA (geospatial data sharing). Without these foundational agreements, the maritime surveillance initiative would lack the technical architecture to function.

Why the Quad Lacks Deep Momentum — Structural Factors

The Quad's inability to consistently deliver on announced initiatives is attributable to several structural factors that UPSC candidates should understand. First, the Quad is not a treaty-based alliance — there is no Article 5-equivalent mutual defence clause, no common budget, and no permanent secretariat. Each initiative depends on ad hoc political will from four different governments with different domestic priorities. Second, the four members have different China exposure — Australia's economy is heavily dependent on Chinese trade; Japan has deep historical and territorial tensions with China; India insists on strategic autonomy and maintains its own bilateral channel with Beijing; the US treats China as its primary strategic competitor. These different China calculations make common action difficult. Third, within the Quad, bilateral relationships (especially India-US) are subject to periodic strains — tariff disputes, visa issues, defence procurement disagreements — that dampen overall momentum.

2025 strain points: leaders' summit postponed (no India-hosted summit); India-US tariff friction under the reciprocal tariff regime; US re-hyphenation of India-Pakistan after Pahalgam attack.
Quad does not have a mutual defence commitment — it cannot be compared to NATO.
Each Quad summit/ministerial adds new initiatives; prior initiatives' delivery record is mixed (e.g., the Vaccine Initiative delivered far less than announced due to US domestic constraints).
The IPMSC (2026 New Delhi meeting) is notable because it has a specific geographic focus (Indian Ocean Region) and is operationally concrete rather than aspirational.
The Fiji port project is the Quad's first joint physical infrastructure initiative — marking a qualitative shift toward delivery.
Analysts at Stimson Center noted the Quad is "finding its footing" — a grouping in transition from dialogue to delivery platform.

Connection to this news: The article's framing — "why the Quad lacks momentum" — directly addresses these structural limitations. UPSC Mains GS2 questions on multilateral forums routinely ask candidates to assess effectiveness and limitations; this framework applies directly to the Quad.

Key Facts & Data

Quad first formed: 2007, ASEAN Regional Forum, Manila (initiated by PM Abe)
Quad dissolved: 2008 (Australia withdrew under PM Kevin Rudd)
Quad revived: 2017, ASEAN Summits, Manila
Quad elevated to leaders' level: 2021 (first virtual summit March 2021; first in-person summit September 2021, Washington D.C.)
Quad members: India, United States, Japan, Australia
New Delhi Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting: May 26, 2026
Key 2026 outcomes: IPMSC (maritime surveillance), Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, Fiji port project, Indo-Pacific Energy Security initiative
LEMOA signed: 2016 | COMCASA signed: 2018 | BECA signed: 2020
India's "Act East Policy": launched as "Look East" in 1992, renamed "Act East" in 2014
FOIP concept formally introduced: August 2016 by PM Abe (Nairobi TICAD VI)
India's SCO membership (full): 2017 (Astana) | BRICS: founding member (2009)