Expert Explains | Why Russia’s growing dependence on China is a threat to India’s security

Vladimir Putin's state visit to Beijing in May 2026 — marking the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation — underscore...

What Happened

Vladimir Putin's state visit to Beijing in May 2026 — marking the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation — underscored Russia's deepening structural dependence on China across economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions.
The two countries signed nearly two dozen agreements covering energy, military AI, arms sales (Su-57 jets, S-500 air defence systems), joint naval exercises in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and a joint statement on global strategic stability.
Security analysts warn that Russia's growing subordination to Chinese strategic preferences fundamentally alters the nature of India's traditionally close partnership with Moscow, which India has relied upon for decades as a counterweight to Chinese influence.
China and Russia agreed to conduct joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean — a development with direct security implications for India's maritime neighbourhood.
Russia's economic dependence on China has accelerated sharply since 2022, with China now Russia's largest trade partner, supplier of dual-use technology, and primary buyer of sanctioned Russian energy.

Static Topic Bridges

India-Russia Strategic Partnership: History and Security Significance for India

India and Russia share one of the longest-standing defence and strategic partnerships among large democracies. Diplomatic relations were established in April 1947, formalised as a Strategic Partnership in 2000, and elevated to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" in 2010. The partnership has been the cornerstone of India's military modernisation: between 2000 and 2020, Russia accounted for approximately 66.5% of India's defence imports.

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1971): India-USSR; assured Soviet diplomatic and military support, including during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War
S-400 Triumf deal: signed 2018, value ~USD 5.43 billion; five squadrons; defied US CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) pressure — underscores India's strategic autonomy doctrine
BrahMos: supersonic cruise missile jointly developed by India's DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia since 1998; speed Mach 2.8–3.0; range exceeding 450 km
RELOS (Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support): operationalised early 2026 — allows both militaries to use each other's bases, ports, and airfields; gives India access to Arctic ports (Murmansk) and Russia access to Indian Ocean facilities
Russia's share of India's arms imports is declining as India diversifies to the US, France, and Israel, but Russia remains the largest single supplier

Connection to this news: If Russia's military and technology decisions increasingly align with Chinese preferences — as the 2026 summit agreements suggest — India faces the prospect of its primary arms supplier and strategic partner becoming a strategic subordinate of its principal adversary.

The China Factor: India's Primary Security Challenge

China presents India's most complex and enduring security challenge. The two nations share a 3,488 km-long disputed border (the Line of Actual Control, LAC), fought a war in 1962, and have experienced multiple crises since, most notably the Galwan Valley clash of June 2020 — the deadliest border confrontation in decades, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. Both are nuclear-armed states with no formal nuclear risk-reduction agreements. Beyond the border, China's maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through the "String of Pearls" strategy — port investments in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the Maldives — directly challenges India's traditional influence in its near neighbourhood.

LAC: 3,488 km long; tri-sector — Western (Ladakh), Middle (Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand), Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim)
Galwan clash: June 15–16, 2020; 20 Indian soldiers killed; no shots fired (weapons ban in the border zone)
Following Galwan: 21 rounds of military talks by 2026; partial disengagement at friction points but overall militarisation continues
China's "String of Pearls": a chain of Chinese-supported port facilities encircling India in the Indian Ocean
China's defence budget 2025–26: approximately 3x India's defence budget [Unverified — approximate]
China-Pakistan Axis: China is Pakistan's largest arms supplier; CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) runs through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), which India claims

Connection to this news: A Russia that increasingly defers to China's strategic preferences — including on India-relevant issues like arms technology transfer, Quad positioning, and Indian Ocean naval strategy — undermines a pillar of India's security architecture that was designed partly to hedge against China.

India's Strategic Autonomy and the Russia-China-India Triangle

India has historically pursued strategic autonomy — the ability to make independent foreign policy decisions unconstrained by bloc membership or great power alignment. India maintained this posture through NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) during the Cold War and has updated it to "multi-alignment" in the current era: simultaneously engaging the US (Quad, I2U2, IPEF), Russia (Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership), and BRICS, while maintaining dialogue with China. Russia's subordination to China threatens to collapse the multi-alignment triangle into a binary: India cannot rely on Russia as a counterweight to China if Russia is effectively aligned with China.

NAM: Founded 1961 (Belgrade); India under Nehru was a founding voice; India still formally a member of the 120-nation NAM
Multi-alignment doctrine: engages US, Russia, China, and Gulf states on separate issue-tracks; issue-based rather than bloc-based
India's Quad membership (with US, Japan, Australia): focused on Indo-Pacific security, supply chains, technology
India's SCO membership (with China, Russia, Pakistan): regional security forum; India joined 2017
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa + new members; India uses BRICS for Global South positioning
The Russia-China-India triangle: India's multi-alignment relied on Russia as a partial counterweight to China; a Russia-China strategic merger dissolves this utility

Connection to this news: The 2026 Putin-Xi summit, with its joint naval exercises planned for the Indian Ocean, directly challenges India's maritime security environment. For India's security planners, the key question is whether Russia's dependence on China has reached a point where Moscow can no longer be considered a reliable partner independent of Beijing's preferences.

Key Facts & Data

India-Russia "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" established: 2010
India-USSR Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation: 1971
Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (China-Russia): 2001 (25th anniversary marked at 2026 summit)
Russia's share of India's arms imports (2000–2020): approximately 66.5%
S-400 deal value: ~USD 5.43 billion (signed 2018)
BrahMos joint development: since 1998; speed Mach 2.8–3.0; range >450 km
Galwan clash: June 15–16, 2020; 20 Indian soldiers killed
LAC total length: 3,488 km
RELOS operationalised: early 2026 (mutual base, port, airfield access)
China-Russia 2026 summit agreements: joint Indian Ocean naval exercises; Su-57 and S-500 sales; military AI cooperation
India joined SCO: 2017