Israel-Iran war LIVE: Iran allows Chinese ships to pass Hormuz since May 13, reports Iranian media

Iran confirmed that approximately 30 Chinese commercial vessels were permitted to transit the Strait of Hormuz beginning the night of May 13, 2026, following...

What Happened

Iran confirmed that approximately 30 Chinese commercial vessels were permitted to transit the Strait of Hormuz beginning the night of May 13, 2026, following diplomatic outreach by China's foreign ministry and its ambassador to Tehran.
Iran's position was that the strait remains open to all commercial ships provided they cooperate with Iranian naval management protocols — effectively asserting Iranian control over passage conditions.
Iran's foreign minister accused the UAE of being "an active partner" in attacks on Iranian territory, significantly escalating diplomatic tensions with a fellow Gulf state.
The selective permission — favouring Chinese ships while others remain blocked — coincided with discussions between the US and Chinese presidents, with China publicly opposing any militarisation or toll-charging on the strait.
The 2026 Hormuz crisis began when Iran shut down or severely restricted the strait following the onset of US-Israeli strikes on Iranian territory in late February 2026.

Static Topic Bridges

The Strait of Hormuz: Geography and Strategic Significance

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and thence to the Arabian Sea. It is bounded by Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula (Oman, with a UAE enclave) to the south. At its narrowest, the strait is approximately 39 kilometres wide.

Approximately 20% of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade and roughly 25–34% of seaborne crude oil trade passes through the strait annually.
In 2025, the EIA estimated nearly 15 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil transited Hormuz, representing the world's single largest oil chokepoint.
About 84% of crude oil and condensate transiting Hormuz in 2024 was destined for Asian markets — primarily China, Japan, South Korea, and India.
The shipping lanes run primarily through Omani territorial waters (southern channel) and Iranian territorial waters (northern channel).

Connection to this news: Iran's ability to selectively grant or deny passage is rooted in the fact that the shipping lanes pass through its territorial waters, though international law (UNCLOS) limits its authority to suspend transit.

UNCLOS and the Right of Transit Passage

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) governs navigation through international straits. Part III of UNCLOS (Articles 34–45) specifically covers "Straits Used for International Navigation."

Article 38 of UNCLOS establishes the right of "transit passage" — all ships and aircraft enjoy the freedom of navigation through straits connecting one part of the high seas or EEZ to another. This right cannot be suspended.
Article 44 prohibits coastal states from hampering transit passage and mandates that any danger to navigation be published.
"Transit passage" differs from "innocent passage" (applicable in ordinary territorial seas): it cannot be suspended even temporarily by the coastal state.
Iran is a signatory to UNCLOS. However, Iran disputes the application of transit passage to the strait, arguing it grants only innocent passage under a 1978 bilateral agreement with Oman.
The US and several Western states assert transit passage rights exist under customary international law even apart from UNCLOS.

Connection to this news: Iran's selective permits — conditioning passage on "cooperation" with Iranian naval forces — is widely interpreted by maritime law experts as inconsistent with the unconditional nature of transit passage under Article 38 of UNCLOS.

China-Iran Strategic Relationship and the 25-Year Cooperation Agreement

China and Iran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement in 2021, reportedly covering a 25-year period. Under US sanctions, China has been the dominant buyer of Iranian oil — reportedly purchasing approximately 90% of Iran's oil exports.

China's strategic interest in keeping the strait open stems from the fact that a large share of its Middle Eastern oil imports transit Hormuz.
China's diplomatic position during the 2026 crisis: opposition to "militarisation" of the strait and rejection of any tolls or conditions on passage.
China's leverage over Iran — as its primary oil customer and diplomatic shield in the UN Security Council — gave Beijing effective influence over Iran's selective opening.

Connection to this news: Iran's decision to allow Chinese ships first reflects the depth of the China-Iran partnership and China's use of economic leverage (as Iran's largest oil buyer) to secure commercial navigation rights for its vessels.

Key Facts & Data

Strait of Hormuz width at narrowest: approximately 39 km (24 miles).
Global oil trade share through Hormuz: approximately 25–34% of seaborne crude oil.
Approximately 30 Chinese vessels were reported as given transit permission from May 13, 2026.
China purchases an estimated 90% of Iranian oil exports despite US sanctions.
UNCLOS Part III Articles 34–45 govern international straits; Article 38 establishes transit passage rights.
Article 44 of UNCLOS: coastal states "shall not hamper transit passage."
The 2026 Hormuz crisis began following US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February 2026.
Iran's foreign minister identified the UAE as an active participant in attacks against Iran.